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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 This case requires us to determine the applicable 
standard of review for situations where a district court has 
imposed a mandatory minimum sentence based upon facts 
that were never charged in the indictment or found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Such errors occur when a 
sentence is imposed in violation of the rule recently set forth 
in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).  
Appellant Jermel Lewis challenges his sentence and contends 
that the failure of the indictment to charge 
an Alleyne element, combined with Alleyne error in jury 
instructions and at sentencing, is structural error.  We hold 
that Alleyne error of the sort alleged here is not structural and 
is instead subject to harmless or plain error analysis under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52.  We conclude that the 
District Court’s error in Lewis’s case was harmless and will 
therefore affirm.  
I. 
 Although this case has a lengthy history, the facts are 
largely undisputed.  Lewis and his co-defendants Glorious 
Shavers and Andrew White (collectively, “defendants”) 
committed an armed robbery of an unlicensed after-hours 
“speakeasy” in North Philadelphia on November 8, 2005.  
The defendants committed the robbery by pointing firearms at 
the customers and employees, ordering them to the floor, and 
threatening to shoot them.  Shavers and White were arrested 
shortly after the robbery, and Lewis was apprehended at a 
later time. 
 Shavers and White were charged on March 20, 2008 
with Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), 
and with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation 
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to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  On 
July 10, 2008, a superseding indictment charged Lewis with 
the same offenses and added attempted witness tampering 
charges against all three defendants.  On August 20, 2009, a 
second superseding indictment added additional witness 
tampering charges and a count of conspiracy to commit 
Hobbs Act robbery against all three defendants.  Count three 
of the Second Superseding Indictment—the only count at 
issue here—provided that the defendants “knowingly used 
and carried, and aided and abetted the use and carrying of, a 
firearm, that is: (1) a shotgun; (2) a Smith & Wesson, .38 
caliber, Special, six-shot revolver, serial number D479345, 
and four live rounds of ammunition; and (3) a handgun, 
during and in relation to a crime of violence.”  App. at 71. 
 The defendants were tried in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania beginning on September 9, 2009.  The 
government presented testimony from Brian Anderson, who 
was a patron at the speakeasy the night of the robbery.  He 
identified Lewis as “a heavier light-skinned guy, [who] had 
another type of handgun—I think it was black—in his hand.”  
App. at 876.  That person “stood in the doorway with the gun 
on everybody.”  Id.  Anderson positively identified Lewis at 
trial. 
 The government also presented testimony from 
Alberto Vazquez, another patron at the speakeasy at the time 
of the robbery.  Vazquez identified Lewis at trial as “the 
general, the leader,” who “had a black 9-millimeter or .45 
caliber. . . . It was a black automatic weapon.  He pulled it out 
of his right side pocket, of the hood pocket.”  App. at 968-69.  
Vazquez further testified that Lewis’s gun was “pointed at 
[Vazquez] and pointed at several other people.”  App. at 970.  
At one point Lewis “pulled [Vazquez’s] shirt up, [and] put the 
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gun to [his] stomach.”  App. at 971.  Vazquez identified 
Lewis as the defendant who robbed him that night. 
 The District Court instructed the jury that Lewis was 
charged with “using and carrying a firearm during the crime 
of violence.”  App. at 2019-21.  The jury found all three 
defendants guilty of the Hobbs Act violations and the § 
924(c) violation, but Lewis was acquitted of all witness 
tampering charges.  Lewis was ultimately sentenced to a term 
of incarceration of 141 months to be followed by five years of 
supervised release.  The term consisted of 57 months’ 
incarceration on each of two Hobbs Act counts, to run 
concurrently with one another, and 84 months’ incarceration, 
the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, on the § 924 
count for brandishing a firearm as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A)(ii),1 to run consecutively. 
 Following sentencing, defendants appealed to this 
Court.  We vacated Shavers’s and White’s witness tampering 
convictions and Shavers’s eight-year term of supervised 
release, but affirmed the remaining convictions and Lewis’s 
sentence.  United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 
2012).  The Supreme Court granted defendants’ petition for a 
writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded for 
further consideration in light of its decision in Alleyne.  
Shavers v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2877 (2013). 
 The government now concedes that the District Court 
erred in imposing an enhancement on Shavers and White for 
obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and those 
                                              
1 Section 924(c)(1)(A) imposes differing mandatory 
minimum sentences depending upon whether the defendant 
“uses or carries,” “brandish[es],” or “discharge[s]” a firearm 
during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. 
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cases have been remanded to the District Court for 
resentencing.  The government continues to oppose Lewis’s 
Alleyne argument, however, which is the only issue remaining 
in this appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Allegations of constitutional error at sentencing are 
subject to plenary review.  United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 
438, 452 (3d Cir. 2001).  “When the defendant has made a 
timely objection to an error and [Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure] 52(a) applies, a court of appeals normally engages 
in a specific analysis of the district court record . . . to 
determine whether the error was prejudicial.”  United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). 
III. 
 Our discussion proceeds in three parts.  First, we 
examine the law of structural error as it has been developed 
and applied to errors under Alleyne and its predecessor, 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  Second, we 
address Lewis’s particular arguments for finding structural 
error in this case.  Third, because we conclude that no 
structural error occurred, we discuss why the Alleyne error in 
this case was harmless.   
A. Structural error jurisprudence and 
Apprendi/Alleyne 
 Two bodies of law govern our structural error analysis.  
The first includes Apprendi and Alleyne and sets forth the rule 
that applies to Lewis’s situation—that facts increasing a 
mandatory minimum sentence must be charged in an 
indictment, presented to a jury, and found beyond a 
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reasonable doubt.  The second arises from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), 
and considers the extent to which some constitutional errors 
are “structural” such that they affect the fundamental fairness 
of criminal proceedings and require automatic reversal. 
 1. Apprendi and Alleyne 
 Apprendi arose in the context of New Jersey’s hate 
crime law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e).  That law permitted 
judges to increase a defendant’s maximum sentence based 
upon a factual finding by a preponderance of the evidence 
that a crime was committed for the purpose of intimidating 
the victim based upon race.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69.  
Apprendi was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment after 
the trial judge increased his statutory maximum term from ten 
to twenty years pursuant to the hate crime statute.  Id. at 470-
71.  The Supreme Court determined that such an increase was 
unconstitutional and held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490.  
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court rejected the distinction 
between an element of a crime and a sentencing factor that 
increased the potential maximum sentence.  Id. at 478-81.  
According to the Court, both types of facts are subject to the 
same constitutional protections.  Id. at 490. 
 Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court addressed the 
corollary issue to that presented in Apprendi; that is, the 
appropriate standard of proof for facts that increase the 
statutory mandatory minimum penalty.  The defendant in 
Alleyne was charged with, among other crimes, using or 
carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in 
violation of § 924(c)(1)(A).  133 S. Ct. at 2155.  At trial, the 
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jury convicted Alleyne of using or carrying a firearm, but 
made no finding regarding whether the firearm was 
brandished.  Id. at 2156.  The District Court nevertheless 
found that Alleyne brandished the firearm by a preponderance 
of the evidence—as was the practice at that time—thus 
triggering the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence in § 
924(c)(1)(A)(ii).  Id. 
 The Alleyne Court extended the logic from Apprendi to 
include those facts that increase the statutory minimum.  
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160 (“While Harris [v. United States, 
536 U.S. 545 (2002)] limited Apprendi to facts increasing the 
statutory maximum, the principle applied in Apprendi applies 
with equal force to facts increasing the mandatory 
minimum.”).  Just as the facts at issue in Apprendi created a 
new penalty by increasing the statutory ceiling, so too did the 
facts in Alleyne that increased the floor.  Id.  The Court thus 
held “that facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences 
must be submitted to the jury” and found beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Id. at 2163.  Both Apprendi and Alleyne are watershed 
decisions that continue to have a substantial impact on 
sentencing law, as will be discussed below. 
 2. Structural error jurisprudence 
 The Supreme Court has recognized that “‘most 
constitutional errors can be harmless.’” Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 
(quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)).  
In general, if a defendant “‘had counsel and was tried by an 
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any 
other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are 
subject to harmless-error analysis.’”  Id. (quoting Rose v. 
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986)) (alteration in original).  The 
types of errors identified by the Supreme Court as 
“‘structural’ and thus subject to automatic reversal [are] ‘very 
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limited.’”  Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 
461, 468 (1997) (listing structural errors as: the complete 
denial of counsel; a biased trial judge; racial discrimination in 
the selection of a grand jury; denial of self-representation at 
trial; denial of a public trial; and a defective reasonable doubt 
instruction)). 
In Neder, the Supreme Court held that a jury 
instruction that omits an element of an offense is subject to 
only harmless error review.2  527 U.S. at 15.  In that case, the 
defendant was charged with several counts of fraud, but the 
district court failed to instruct the jury on the element of 
“materiality.”  Id. at 4.  In reviewing the error, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that “[u]nlike such defects as the 
complete deprivation of counsel or trial before a biased judge, 
an instruction that omits an element of the offense does not 
necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an 
unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.”  Id. at 
9.  As such, the Court looked to other cases involving 
omission or “misdescription” of an element, and to situations 
where Sixth Amendment violations occurred because the 
jury, for various reasons, failed to return a “complete verdict” 
on each element of an offense.  Id. at 10-13 (citing California 
v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996) (per curiam) (omission from jury 
instruction); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (per 
curiam) (jury applied an unconstitutional mandatory 
conclusive presumption); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 
(1987) (jury rendered a finding on the wrong element)).  
Despite these errors, the Court in each prior instance 
                                              
2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) defines harmless 
error review and provides that “[a]ny error, defect, 
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights 
must be disregarded.” 
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reviewed for harmlessness, thus supporting the conclusion in 
Neder that Sixth Amendment errors arising from a jury 
verdict are not structural defects. 
 This Court first addressed the implications of structural 
error in the context of Apprendi in United States v. Vazquez, 
271 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).  The defendant in 
Vazquez was charged with conspiring to possess and 
distribute “more than 5 kilos of cocaine” in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841.  Id. at 96.  Neither the government 
nor the defendant requested an instruction requiring the jury 
to find a particular quantity of cocaine, but the judge at 
sentencing found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
nearly two kilograms of cocaine were attributable to the 
defendant, and he was sentenced to twenty-four years’ 
imprisonment.  Id. at 96-99. 
 On appeal we concluded that the defendant’s sentence 
violated Apprendi because it was imposed based upon a drug 
quantity finding that increased his guidelines sentence above 
the twenty-year statutory maximum.  Id. at 99.  Applying 
plain error review,3 we accepted that the district court erred 
and that the error was plain, but engaged in a lengthy 
discussion about whether the error affected the defendant’s 
                                              
3 When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal we review 
for plain error, which requires a showing of “‘(1) error, (2) 
that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights.  If all 
three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise 
its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the 
error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.’”  Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 99 
(quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-67). 
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substantial rights.4  Id. at 99-100.  We addressed that issue in 
three parts. 
We first characterized Apprendi error as a combination 
of both trial and sentencing error rooted in the Due Process 
Clause and Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury trial 
guarantees.  Id. at 101.  In so concluding, we noted that 
Apprendi error involves the interplay between errors both at 
sentencing—“imposing a sentence beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum”—and at trial—“failing to submit an 
element of the offense to the jury.”  Id.  “On the one hand, the 
trial error exists only because of the sentencing error.  On the 
other hand, the sentencing error cannot occur without the trial 
error.  Thus, an appropriate remedy must recognize that each 
Apprendi violation is both a trial and a sentencing error.”  Id.  
This conclusion allowed us to review the entire trial record 
when considering whether “we [could] say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the same 
absent the trial error.”  Id. We also noted that the combined 
trial and sentencing error paradigm comported with Supreme 
Court precedent in Neder and Johnson (which both addressed 
trial errors) insofar as “in those cases the trial error resulted in 
a constitutional defect, necessitating an inquiry as to whether 
the defendant’s substantial rights were affected.”  Id. at 102. 
 We next addressed structural error.  Relying heavily 
upon the structural error jurisprudence enunciated in Neder, 
we concluded that Apprendi error, as a sentencing and trial 
                                              
4 Importantly, we acknowledged that the substantial rights 
prong of the plain error analysis is “essentially identical” to 
harmless error analysis, “with the exception of the burden of 
proof.”  Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 100.  The Government has the 
burden of proof under harmless error, while the defendant has 
the burden under plain error.  Id. 
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error, is not structural.  Id. at 103.  In support, we identified 
decisions recognizing that both trial error and sentencing 
error can be harmless.  Id. (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 9 (trial 
error harmless); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 402-05 
(1999) (sentencing error harmless)).  Because the errors had 
been found harmless individually, we determined that they 
remained harmless even in conjunction with each other.  
Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103. 
Finally, based upon our review of the trial record, we 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s 
sentence would have been the same had the jury been 
properly instructed with respect to drug quantity.  Id. at 104.  
The Apprendi error did not affect the defendant’s substantial 
rights and was, therefore, harmless.  Id. 
 Several Supreme Court decisions since Vazquez have 
continued to explore the interplay between Apprendi and 
structural error.  The Supreme Court addressed Apprendi in 
the context of indictment and trial error in United States v. 
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002).  The indictment in that case 
failed to allege a specific drug quantity that could have led to 
enhanced penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), and the jury 
was likewise not instructed to make a specific finding with 
respect to drug quantity.  Id. at 628.  Cotton was nevertheless 
sentenced in violation of Apprendi above the statutory 
maximum based upon the trial judge’s factual findings.  Id.  
No party objected to these errors.  Id. at 627. 
 In assessing Cotton’s case, the Supreme Court rejected 
the notion that the failure to allege drug quantity in the 
indictment was a “jurisdictional defect” that required 
automatic reversal.  Id. at 629-31.  Reviewing for plain error, 
the Court avoided the question of whether Apprendi error is 
structural and held instead that Cotton’s claim failed under 
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the fourth prong of plain error review.  Id. at 632-33.  The 
Court noted that the drug quantity evidence was 
“‘overwhelming’ and ‘essentially uncontroverted,’” and thus 
did not affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.  Id. at 633 (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 
470).  In concluding, the Court recognized that: 
Respondents emphasize that the 
Fifth Amendment grand jury right 
serves a vital function in 
providing for a body of citizens 
that acts as a check on 
prosecutorial power.  No doubt 
that is true. . . . But that is surely 
no less true of the Sixth 
Amendment right to a petit jury, 
which, unlike the grand jury, must 
find guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The important role of the 
petit jury did not, however, 
prevent us in Johnson from 
applying the longstanding rule 
“that a constitutional right may be 
forfeited in criminal as well as 
civil cases by the failure to make 
timely assertion of the right.” 
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Id. at 634 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 
(1944)).5   
 The most recent Supreme Court decision in this area is 
Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006), which held 
that error premised on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004)6 is not structural and is subject only to harmless error 
review.  Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 222.  Recuenco is as close as 
the Supreme Court has come to deciding the issue in this 
case.  The indictment in Recuenco charged the defendant with 
assault with a deadly weapon and the jury found him guilty of 
the same.  Id. at 215.  Despite the jury’s finding that the 
defendant committed the assault with a “deadly weapon” 
(which was subject to a one-year sentencing enhancement) 
the trial court applied a three-year sentencing enhancement 
for assault with a “firearm.”7  Id.  The Supreme Court found 
the error to be harmless and reaffirmed its holding in 
Apprendi that sentencing factors and elements are both 
afforded similar constitutional protections.  Id. at 220. 
                                              
5 The Supreme Court also explicitly passed on deciding the 
question at issue in this case, i.e., “whether the omission of an 
element of a criminal offense from a federal indictment can 
constitute harmless error,” in United States v. Resendiz-
Ponce.  549 U.S. 102, 104 (2007) (resolving the issue on 
other grounds). 
6 Blakely involved the application of Apprendi to a state 
criminal conviction.  542 U.S. at 301. 
7 The indictment did acknowledge that the defendant 
possessed a handgun by charging “intentiona[l] assault . . . 
with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a handgun.”  Recuenco, 548 
U.S. at 215.  The charge, however, was assault with a deadly 
weapon, not assault with a firearm.  Id.   
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 The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the 
sentencing court’s finding amounted to “a directed verdict of 
guilt on an offense (assault in the second degree while armed 
with a firearm) greater than the one for which the jury 
convicted him (assault in the second degree while armed with 
any deadly weapon).”  Id. at 221.  In doing so, the Court 
analogized to Neder and noted that “[b]ecause Neder’s jury 
did not find him guilty of each of the elements of the offenses 
with which he was charged, its verdict is no more fairly 
described as a complete finding of guilt of the crimes for 
which the defendant was sentenced than is the verdict here.”  
Id. (noting that the differences between Recuenco’s case and 
Neder should not be given “constitutional significance”).  The 
Court concluded by holding that “[f]ailure to submit a 
sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element 
to the jury, is not structural error.”  Id. at 222. 
 With these legal principles in mind, we now consider 
whether Alleyne error of the sort alleged by Lewis is 
structural or if it is subject only to review for harmlessness. 
 
 
B. Alleyne error is not structural error 
 In concluding that the Alleyne error in this case is not 
structural, we must address Lewis’s argument that his case is 
unique because the indictment failed to allege the brandishing 
element.  As a result, he maintains that he was charged and 
convicted of a different crime (use and carrying a firearm) 
than that for which he was sentenced (brandishing a firearm).  
This issue represents a subtle difference from the facts in 
Vazquez, which involved an indictment that charged the 
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proper drug quantity.8  Despite this difference, we find that 
the rationale in Vazquez, along with subsequent Supreme 
Court precedent, clearly establishes that the Alleyne error in 
this case is not structural.   
 1. Alleyne error and structural error 
 We note at the outset that Lewis faces an uphill battle 
with respect to structural error.  The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged a strong presumption that constitutional errors 
are harmless, and that structural error exists only in a “limited 
class of cases.”  Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Bearing these general principles in mind, we 
now turn to our decision in Vazquez, which held that the 
analogous Apprendi error is not structural.     
 The primary difference between the facts of this case 
and those in Vazquez is the addition of error at the indictment 
                                              
8 We recognize that Vazquez addressed Apprendi error, but 
find its reasoning equally applicable to cases implicating 
Alleyne.  See United States v. Lara-Ruiz, 721 F.3d 554, 557 
(8th Cir. 2013) (applying same standards under both Apprendi 
and Alleyne error). 
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stage.9  In Vazquez, the indictment charged a drug quantity 
that implicated a heightened statutory maximum penalty, 
whereas the indictment in Lewis’s case failed to charge the 
“brandishing” element in § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).  The addition of 
the indictment error in this case implicates the Fifth 
Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury.  We relied in 
Vazquez on the fact that Apprendi error was “grounded in the 
Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s notice and 
jury trial guarantees.”  Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 101.  Alleyne 
recognized the same.  133 S. Ct. at 2156 (“The Sixth 
Amendment provides that those ‘accused’ of a ‘crime’ have 
the right to a trial ‘by an impartial jury.’  This right, in 
conjunction with the Due Process Clause . . . .”).  Although 
neither specifically acknowledged it, we see no principled 
reason why the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights recognized 
                                              
9 Lewis characterizes the error in this case as having occurred 
at the indictment, trial, and sentencing phases of proceedings.  
In one sense this is incorrect because the indictment, jury 
charge, and verdict were all consistent with respect to the 
“use and carrying” element of § 924.  Viewed that way, the 
error that occurred in this case was limited to sentencing, 
where the District Court imposed the sentence for 
brandishing.  Error that occurs only at sentencing is not 
structural.  See, e.g., Jones, 527 U.S. at 402-05.  As discussed 
above, however, this “sentencing-error-only” interpretation is 
inconsistent with our holding in Vazquez that Apprendi error 
(along with the corollary Alleyne error) is both trial and 
sentencing error.  271 F.3d at 101-02.  Because Lewis does 
not seriously challenge the application of the harmless error 
test (and thus concedes that he loses under harmless error 
review regardless of when that error occurred), we need not 
resolve the issue today. 
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as potentially harmless in both Vazquez and Alleyne cannot 
also be read to include the Fifth Amendment right to a grand 
jury indictment. 
Supreme Court precedent in this area strongly supports 
our conclusion.  Neder, like Vazquez, found that a defective 
jury instruction on an essential element of the offense was 
subject only to harmless error review.  527 U.S. at 15.  The 
underlying constitutional error identified in Neder was, of 
course, the deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial on that element.  Id. at 12.  Although Neder was 
limited to the Sixth Amendment right and did not consider the 
grand jury right under the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court nevertheless acknowledged that “most constitutional 
errors can be harmless.”  Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The Neder Court, in listing the errors it has deemed 
to be structural, likewise made no mention of the Fifth 
Amendment right to a grand jury indictment.  Id.   
Recuenco, on the other hand, extended the reasoning in 
Neder and found no structural error in a situation where the 
indictment did not charge a required element.  548 U.S. at 
222.  In fact, Recuenco provides the missing link between this 
case and our analysis in Vazquez because it recognized that 
errors in an indictment can be harmless.10  Because Vazquez 
                                              
10 We acknowledge that the indictment in Recuenco did 
mention that a firearm was present, even though the actual 
charge was only for assault with a deadly weapon.  We find 
this point to be irrelevant, however, because the indictment in 
this case also contained allegations of brandishing, albeit not 
in so many words.  See discussion at Section III.C., infra.  To 
the extent that the indictments in this case and in Recuenco 
contained sufficient allegations in substance if not in form, 
the two cases are indistinguishable. 
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based its holding upon Supreme Court precedent finding that 
sentencing and trial error are subject to review for 
harmlessness, Recuenco now allows us to extend that 
rationale and conclude that omission of a sentencing factor 
from an indictment is likewise subject only to harmless error 
review.  Because errors occurring at the indictment, trial, and 
sentencing phases of proceedings are subject to harmless 
error review individually, we conclude that the three in 
conjunction likewise can be harmless.  See Vazquez, 271 F.3d 
at 103.  In short, we see no reason why the differences 
between this case and Vazquez should be given 
“constitutional significance.”  Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 220. 
Our conclusion is also supported by Cotton, 
which ultimately held that the Sixth Amendment petit jury 
right, like the Fifth Amendment grand jury right, “serves a 
vital function . . . as a check on prosecutorial power.” 535 
U.S. at 634.  It went on to state that the Sixth Amendment 
petit jury right was “at least as important” as the Fifth 
Amendment grand jury right.  Id.  The Court, therefore, 
implied that it would not treat Fifth Amendment indictment 
error differently than Sixth Amendment trial error because 
the Fifth Amendment grand jury right is no more 
sacrosanct—and thus no more worthy of heightened 
protection—than the Sixth Amendment right that is subject 
only to harmless error review.   
Similarly, we are persuaded by the government’s 
compelling argument highlighting the nature of the Fifth 
Amendment grand jury right as it compares to the Sixth 
Amendment right to a petit jury.  Specifically, the 
government notes that, unlike the right to a petit jury: (1) the 
Fifth Amendment grand jury right has not been deemed so 
fundamental as to be applicable to the states by way of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the grand jury is not the final 
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arbiter of the facts, and must only find facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence; and (3) the petit jury provides 
far greater protection for the accused by operating in public, 
relying upon admissible evidence from both the prosecution 
and the accused, and voting unanimously to convict.   
The government contends that, based upon the factors 
listed above, the Sixth Amendment right to a petit jury 
provides more robust protections that go to the “‘framework 
within which the trial proceeds,’” and is thus more worthy of 
protection under the ambit of structural error than the Fifth 
Amendment grand jury right.  Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103 
(quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310).  Yet, despite these 
important considerations, the Supreme Court has never 
extended the structural error doctrine to include an 
abridgment of the Sixth Amendment right of the type at issue 
in this case.  See Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 222 (“Failure to 
submit a sentencing factor to a jury . . . is not structural 
error.”); Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 (“The omission of an element 
[from a jury instruction] is an error that is subject to harmless-
error analysis.”).  Given the comparative weaknesses in the 
Fifth Amendment right, the Supreme Court is therefore less 
likely to find structural error in a situation like Lewis’s.  We 
agree with the government that this consideration weighs in 
favor of applying harmless error review in this case. 
Finally, we note that our decision comports with that 
of every court of appeals to have addressed this issue in the 
context of Alleyne error.  See United States v. Harakaly, 734 
F.3d 88, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that “[i]n light of the 
long line of cases subjecting preserved Apprendi errors to 
harmless-error review, there would appear to be no basis for 
finding Alleyne error to be one of those rare cases to which 
harmless-error review does not apply”); United States v. 
McKinley, 732 F.3d 1291, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying 
 
21 
plain error review of Alleyne error in which indictment and 
jury charge both involved use or carrying of a firearm, but 
sentence was for brandishing);11 United States v. Mack, 729 
                                              
11 We note that almost none of the decisions Lewis cites in his 
brief involve Apprendi error—which is the most closely 
analogous situation to his case.  This omission is unsurprising 
because courts of appeals have “almost uniformly held that 
the failure of the indictment to include the Apprendi-element, 
like the failure to submit that element to the jury, [is] subject 
to harmless error review.”  5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., 
Criminal Procedure § 19.3(a) (3d ed. 2007).  Indeed, courts of 
appeals routinely subject Apprendi errors at both the 
indictment and conviction stage to harmless or plain error 
review.  See United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143, 156 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (finding that Apprendi errors stemming from 
indictment omissions are reviewed for harmless error); United 
States v. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(finding that preserved Apprendi errors are reviewed for 
harmless error); United States v. Mackins, 315 F.3d 399, 405-
06, 409-10 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing applicability of 
harmless error review to Apprendi error); United States v. 
Baptiste, 309 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 2002) (recognizing a 
change in circuit precedent and applying harmless error 
review to Apprendi error in indictment); United States v. 
Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 318-21 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting 
structural error argument and applying harmless error review 
to alleged Apprendi error); United States v. Jordan, 291 F.3d 
1091, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying harmless error where 
drug quantity was neither alleged in the indictment nor 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but concluding 
that record was not sufficient to demonstrate that error was 
harmless); United States v. Adkins, 274 F.3d 444, 454 (7th 
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F.3d 594, 606-09 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting structural error 
argument and analyzing Alleyne error for plain error); United 
States v. Kirklin, 727 F.3d 711, 718-19 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(applying plain error review to alleged Alleyne error); Lara-
Ruiz, 721 F.3d at 557-58 (recognizing that Apprendi errors 
(and by extension, Alleyne errors) are not structural, but 
reversing on ground that defendant failed to meet plain error 
                                                                                                     
Cir. 2001) (recognizing that Apprendi errors of failing to 
allege a drug quantity in an indictment are subject to harmless 
error review); Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103 (finding that 
Apprendi error is not a structural defect); United States v. 
Smith, 240 F.3d 927, 930 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that 
harmless error review applies to Apprendi errors);United 
States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(applying harmless error review to alleged Apprendi error).  
Because courts have consistently analyzed Apprendi errors 
under the paradigm set forth in Rule 52 (either under plain 
error or harmless error), that practice is persuasive for finding 
that structural error is not applicable in the present case.  See 
Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 94 (“Since Alleyne is an extension of 
the Apprendi doctrine, the same standards should apply to 
Alleyne errors.”). 
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standard).12  Absent any authority to the contrary, harmless 
error review is appropriate in this case.   
In light of the foregoing, we hold that when an 
indictment fails to charge a sentencing factor or element of an 
offense and the jury fails to find the same beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the resulting Alleyne error is not structural.  
When properly preserved, such error is reviewed for 
harmlessness under Rule 52(a). 
2. Lewis’s due process, automatic reversal, and 
constructive amendment arguments 
 
Before we apply the harmless error test, we must 
address Lewis’s remaining arguments that, even if Alleyne 
error is not structural, reversal and remand is necessary in his 
case.  He asserts three arguments: First, that due process 
considerations require reversal where a defendant was 
charged and convicted of a crime different than that for which 
he was sentenced; second, that the “automatic reversal” rule 
requires remand in this case; and third, that his sentence 
                                              
12 Lewis cites extensively to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Lara-Ruiz, but we find that his reliance is misplaced in the 
context of his structural error argument.  That case explicitly 
rejected the application of structural error with respect to both 
Apprendi and Alleyne.  Lara-Ruiz, 721 F.3d at 557 (“This 
circuit has held that Apprendi errors do not create structural 
error that would require per se reversal. . . . Given this 
background, and considering that Alleyne was decided to 
reconcile statutory minimums with the Court’s reasoning in 
Apprendi . . . it follows that review pursuant to Rule 52’s 
standards should be applied to this case.” (citations omitted)).  
Structural error was therefore not at issue in Lara-Ruiz. 
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reflects an impermissible constructive amendment of the 
indictment.  We address each argument below.   
Due process 
Lewis first relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dunn v. United States for the proposition that “appellate 
courts are not free to revise the basis on which a defendant is 
convicted simply because the same result would likely obtain 
on retrial.”  442 U.S. 100, 107 (1979).  Dunn, he contends, 
identifies due process concerns in this case that require 
reversal.  We disagree.  Dunn is distinguishable because it 
involved a challenge to the defendant’s conviction on grounds 
that the indictment was insufficient to support the conviction.   
Dunn turned on whether an interview in an attorney’s 
office constituted an “ancillary” proceeding as used in 18 
U.S.C. § 1623.13  442 U.S. at 102.  The indictment charged 
that the statements made in the attorney’s office were false 
because they were inconsistent with the defendant’s prior 
testimony before a grand jury.  Id. at 103-04.  The district 
court and the court of appeals upheld the conviction based 
instead on inconsistencies between the defendant’s grand jury 
testimony and his testimony at an evidentiary hearing (not his 
statements in the attorney’s office).  Id. at 104-05.   
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the 
statements made in the attorney’s office were not “ancillary” 
to a court proceeding.  Id. at 113.  Because the indictment 
                                              
13 Section 1623 states, in pertinent part, that “[w]hoever under 
oath . . . in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or 
grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false 
material declaration . . . shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”  18 U.S.C. § 
1623(a). 
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relied solely on the statements in the attorney’s office, it 
failed to state an offense within the scope of the statute.  Id. at 
107.  The facts alleged in the indictment against Dunn 
therefore did not support a finding of any criminal conduct, 
even though other facts developed at trial did.  Lewis, on the 
other hand, does not challenge his conviction in this appeal.  
Indeed, there is no dispute over whether the indictment stated 
an offense.  This fact alone is sufficient to distinguish Dunn 
and render it inapplicable to this case.   
Moreover, although Dunn did recognize the potential 
due process pitfalls associated with an insufficient indictment, 
its holding is consistent with ours today for two reasons.  
First, Dunn was decided before the acknowledgement in 
Neder that most constitutional errors can be harmless.  Courts 
now apply harmless error review even where the indictment 
fails to include a sentencing factor.  See Recuenco, 548 U.S. 
at 221-22.  To the extent that Dunn did not recognize that 
constitutional errors can be harmless, it should be limited to 
its facts and not be broadly applied to situations like Lewis’s.  
Second, neither Neder nor Apprendi cited Dunn, nor has the 
Supreme Court found reversal to be necessary when an 
indictment fails to charge an element of the offense.  See, e.g., 
Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629-33 (holding that failure to allege an 
element in the indictment is not a “jurisdictional defect” that 
requires automatic reversal where evidence of the missing 
element was “overwhelming” and “essentially 
uncontroverted”).  In light of the subsequent Supreme Court 
precedent, we conclude that the due process concerns 
addressed in Dunn only arise in situations where an 
indictment fails to charge any offense.  It is thus not 
controlling in this case. 
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Automatic reversal 
Lewis’s second argument is that we should apply the 
so-called “automatic reversal rule” to the Alleyne error in this 
case.  He again relies upon decisions that predate Neder and 
Apprendi in support, and we reject it on the basis that none of 
the decisions he cites are analogous to this case. 
Much like Dunn, the decisions Lewis cites in support 
of automatic reversal involved defective indictments that 
failed to allege any criminal conduct.  See United States v. 
Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1979) (failure to 
allege a subsequent overt act in a prosecution for violation of 
the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)); United States v. Beard, 
414 F.2d 1014, 1015 (3d Cir. 1969) (failure to allege 
“unlawful or fraudulent intent” in prosecution for interstate 
transport of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. § 2314); United States 
v. Manuszak, 234 F.2d 421, 422-23 (3d Cir. 1956) (failure to 
allege “the specific place or facility from which the goods 
were taken” in prosecution for theft of goods from an 
interstate shipment of freight pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 659); 
see also United States v. Pickett, 353 F.3d 62, 67-68 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (failure to allege that false statements were made 
“within an ‘investigation or review’” in a prosecution for 
making false statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001); United States v. 
Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (failure to allege 
that defendant acted knowingly or willingly in a prosecution 
under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951).  Lewis’s reliance on 
these cases misses the mark because they all address 
situations where there was no criminal conduct alleged, and 
thus the indictment was susceptible to dismissal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3), or arrest of 
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judgment pursuant to Rule 34(a).14  That is not the situation 
here, where Lewis does not challenge his indictment or 
conviction, and where both assert a valid § 924 offense.  
Because courts of appeals almost universally apply harmless 
error in Apprendi and Alleyne situations, we reject Lewis’s 
contention that automatic reversal is appropriate in this case.  
Constructive amendment 
 Lewis’s final argument is based upon the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Lara-Ruiz, which addressed Alleyne 
error under the plain error standard and found that substantial 
rights were affected where the defendant “was sentenced for a 
statutory crime different from that which the jury found him 
guilty.”  721 F.3d at 558 (addressing situation where the 
defendant was convicted of using a firearm under § 924 but 
was sentenced for brandishing).  We reject Lewis’s argument 
because we find Lara-Ruiz’s reasoning to be inconsistent with 
our interpretation of the substantial rights inquiry under 
harmless error. 
                                              
14 Courts have even applied harmless error where a defect in 
the indictment could be grounds for dismissal.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Cor-Bon Custom Bullet Co., 287 F.3d 576, 
580-81 (6th Cir. 2002) (failure to allege an affirmative act in 
a tax evasion case is harmless error); United States v. 
Corporan-Cuevas, 244 F.3d 199, 201-02 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(finding that failure to allege an element when there is 
question as to whether the element is “essential” is subject to 
harmless error); United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 
311 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that the failure to allege an 
essential element of the offense in the indictment is subject to 
harmless error review where the indictment otherwise gives 
the defendant notice of the charges against him).   
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Without explicitly characterizing it as such, the court 
in Lara-Ruiz appears to have arrived at the outcome in that 
case by finding a constructive amendment of the indictment.  
Constructive amendment “occurs where a defendant is 
deprived of his ‘substantial right to be tried only on charges 
presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury.’”  United 
States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 140 (1985)).  We have 
found constructive amendments to be “‘per se reversible 
under harmless error review.’”  United States v. Daraio, 445 
F.3d 253, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Syme, 276 F.3d at 
136); see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217-19 
(1960) (seminal decision recognizing constructive 
amendment).15  In essence, the Eighth Circuit emphasized the 
dissonance between the indictment and conviction, on the one 
hand, and the sentence imposed, on the other. 
We are not persuaded by Lewis’s argument based 
upon Stirone and its progeny because we have suggested in 
dictum that constructive amendments are not structural errors.  
Syme, 276 F.3d at 155 n.10 (“We note, however, that it is 
doubtful that constructive amendments are structural errors as 
the Supreme Court has defined that category. . . . Notably, 
                                              
15 Stirone relied heavily upon the earlier decision in Ex Parte 
Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887).  Bain, however, was later overruled 
by Cotton “insofar as [Bain] held that a defective indictment 
deprives a court of jurisdiction.”  Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631.  
Lewis relies on United States v. Spinner, which, like Bain, 
found automatic reversal to apply on grounds that “the 
indictment in [Spinner’s] case was jurisdictionally defective.”  
180 F.3d 514, 516 (3d Cir. 1999).  Reversal for jurisdictional 
reasons is now prohibited by the holding in Cotton, and 
Spinner is thus of limited utility in this case.   
 
29 
neither Johnson nor Neder cited Stirone or listed constructive 
amendments as one of the narrow class of recognized 
structural errors.”).  “Courts viewing the Apprendi-element 
pleading error as essentially presenting a constructive 
amendment issue . . . distinguish the Stirone precedent . . . in 
the course of supporting application of a harmless error 
standard.”  LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 19.3(a) 
(citing, inter alia, McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 
1253-54 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that Apprendi errors are not 
constructive amendments subject to automatic reversal under 
Stirone, but instead represent, at most, a variance subject to 
harmless error review)).  We agree with this approach and 
likewise reject Lara-Ruiz’s constructive amendment 
argument. 
Multiple courts of appeals have similarly rejected the 
notion that the Stirone constructive amendment rule requires 
per se reversal in Apprendi cases.  See McCoy, 266 F.3d at 
1253-54; Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d at 310-11 (rejecting an 
argument seeking automatic reversal under Stirone and noting 
that “there is no reason to think the grand jury would have 
had any trouble in rendering an indictment specifying the 
weapons used, and there was no variance”).  McCoy provides 
two reasons why automatic reversal is not necessary in 
Apprendi/Alleyne error situations.  First, Apprendi errors do 
not present “typical” indictment problems, i.e., where the 
indictment fails to state any offense; instead, the indictment in 
an Apprendi case “still charges a complete federal offense.”  
McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1253.  Second, the court rejected the 
notion that any variance in an Apprendi case is so substantial 
as to require automatic reversal.  Id. at 1253-54.  Specifically, 
the court noted that “Stirone involved a material difference 
between the facts alleged in the indictment in support of that 
element—extortion in the transportation of sand from other 
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states into Pennsylvania—and the facts shown at trial—
extortion in the transportation of steel from Pennsylvania into 
Michigan and Kentucky.”  Id. at 1253 (citing Stirone, 361 
U.S. at 213-14).  This difference in proof “materially 
broadened and altered [the indictment] to such a significant 
extent as to constitute an entirely new or different theory of 
the case.”  Id.  No such difference in proof exists in Alleyne or 
Apprendi cases, where the only difference is with respect to a 
particular statutory subsection that aggravates the punishment 
imposed, not the entire “theory of the case.”  Id.  We agree 
with the reasoning in McCoy that constructive amendment 
does not apply to the facts of this case and ultimately 
conclude that Lewis’s substantial rights were not affected.   
C. Harmless error standard 
 We now determine whether the facts of this case 
demonstrate that the sentence imposed for brandishing was 
harmless error.16  Lewis makes no argument with respect to 
the factual basis for finding harmless error, but the 
government identifies several facts in the record indicating 
that both the grand and petit juries in this case would, absent 
the Alleyne error, have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Lewis brandished a firearm. 
 In the context of Apprendi error, particularly where the 
defendant challenges the sentence imposed (as is the case 
here), we have defined the substantial rights inquiry as 
“determining whether [the sentence] would have been the 
                                              
16 We questioned whether Lewis objected to the 
“brandishing” element at sentencing for purposes of 
preserving his Alleyne argument on appeal.  The government 
concedes this point and we are thus satisfied that review for 
harmless error is appropriate.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). 
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same absent the failure to submit [the brandishing element] 
for a jury determination.”  Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 104.  That 
determination must be made beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the government bears the burden of proof.  Id.; Olano, 507 
U.S. at 734.  Because Lewis also alleges error at the 
indictment stage, we first consider whether the grand jury, if 
asked, would have charged him with brandishing a firearm.   
 With respect to the indictment, there is no question 
that the grand jury did in fact find that the brandishing 
element was satisfied.  The Second Superseding Indictment, 
in the context of the Hobbs Act count, alleges that the 
defendants “point[ed] firearms at the customers and 
employees, order[ed] them to the floor, and threatene[d] to 
shoot them.”  App. at 70.  Section 924 defines “brandishing” 
as “to display all or part of the firearm, or otherwise make the 
presence of the firearm known to another person, in order to 
intimidate that person, regardless of whether the firearm is 
directly visible to that person.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4).  The 
allegations already in the indictment, therefore, are more than 
sufficient to satisfy the brandishing element.  The government 
is correct that had prosecutors asked the grand jury to include 
this language in the § 924(c) count it would have been 
included and would have eliminated any defect with respect 
to the indictment.  Any error with respect to the indictment 
was, therefore, harmless. 
 The evidence adduced at trial was likewise sufficient 
to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis’s 
sentence would have been the same absent the failure to 
submit the brandishing element to the jury.  See Vazquez, 271 
F.3d at 104.  The government met its burden by presenting 
testimony from Anderson and Vazquez, both of whom 
confirmed that Lewis was one of the three men who entered 
the speakeasy and “stood in the doorway with the gun on 
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everybody.”  App. at 876.  Vazquez testified that the gun was 
“pointed at [him] and pointed at several other people,” App. 
at 970, and at one point Lewis “pulled [Vazquez’s] shirt up, 
[and] put the gun to [his] stomach.”  App. at 971.  He 
reported “fearing for his life.”  App. at 1044-45.   
Lewis essentially concedes that this record evidence 
supports the District Court’s finding that he brandished a 
firearm during the robbery, and we agree that the testimony 
supports that conclusion.  See Neder, 527 U.S. at 17 (finding 
error to be harmless “where a reviewing court concludes 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was 
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence”).  
Indeed, Lewis presents no evidence to rebut the government’s 
showing at trial.  The testimony from Anderson and Vazquez 
clearly demonstrates that Lewis went beyond mere “use” of a 
firearm, and instead brandished it as per the requirements of § 
924(c)(4).  It is safe to conclude, therefore, that in light of the 
“‘overwhelming’ and ‘uncontroverted’ evidence” in support 
of the brandishing element that, had the jury been properly 
instructed on that element, it would have found that element 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Any resulting error was therefore 
harmless. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will AFFIRM the 
sentence imposed by the District Court. 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 Jermel Lewis was sentenced for the crime of 
brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, when 
he had been not been indicted for, and the jury had not 
convicted him of, that crime.  The District Court improperly 
sentenced Lewis in accordance with a mandatory minimum of 
seven years.  Had this error not occurred, Lewis would have 
been sentenced with a mandatory minimum of five years.  I 
submit that this constitutes reversible error that is not 
harmless, because it violated Lewis’s Sixth Amendment 
rights, as clearly announced in Alleyne, and the resulting 
sentence was more harsh than it should have been. 
 
 At the outset, I note that Alleyne’s pronouncement – 
which is controlling here – was made without the issue of 
structural or harmless error having been discussed.  Perhaps it 
was not raised, or perhaps a sentencing error concerning the 
mandatory maximum or minimum – based on facts not found 
by the jury – was so clearly a harmful violation of the Sixth 
Amendment that it made the very idea of harmless error 
unthinkable.  I also note that the jurisprudence in the area of 
structural versus harmless error, discussed below, is very 
nuanced and we lack specific guidance in the area before us. 
 Thus, we must reason as best we can in this difficult, but 
important, area of the law. 
 
 We begin with the understanding that what happened 
here was without a doubt wrong, and a wrong of 
constitutional significance.  The issue then is how wrong and 
what to do about it.  In Alleyne, an identical violation required 
a remand “for resentencing consistent with the jury’s verdict.”  
133 S. Ct. 2151, 2164 (2013).  I suggest that here, no matter 
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what lens of review governs our reasoning, whether for 
harmless or structural error, the result must be the same.  The 
District Court’s sentence must be vacated and Lewis 
resentenced with the correct mandatory minimum; Alleyne 
requires no less. 
  
I.  Sentencing Error 
 
 The most straightforward way to reason to this result is 
to first concede, for the sake of argument, that harmless error 
review governs (though I challenge this at length below).  But 
it is critical to locate precisely what type of error is at issue.  
The error here was that Lewis was not sentenced “consistent 
with the jury’s verdict,” as Alleyne requires.  Id.  The Alleyne 
Court did not order a new trial, so that the missing 
brandishing element could be proven to the jury, but rather 
required a resentencing, thus properly regarding the error as 
having occurred at the sentencing phase, and harmlessness 
here must be judged from that vantage point.  How can 
Lewis’s sentence, imposing a mandatory minimum of seven 
years, be harmless, when without the brandishing finding the 
mandatory minimum would have been five years? 
 
 The error caused by the District Court was not, as it 
was not in Alleyne, a trial error.  Had it been, the majority’s 
look back at what the evidence revealed at trial would be an 
appropriate exercise in testing for harmlessness.  But it is not 
the proper inquiry here.  I suggest, after Alleyne, that given 
the nature of the error before us, the question is simply 
whether Lewis was prejudiced by his unconstitutional 
sentence.  He clearly was. 
 
3 
 
 Our precedent concerning non-constitutional 
sentencing errors confirms this conclusion.  In United States 
v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2008), we held that 
where a district court uses an erroneous Guidelines range at 
sentencing, “[t]he record must show that the sentencing judge 
would have imposed the same sentence under a correct 
Guidelines range, that is, that the sentencing Guidelines range 
did not affect the sentence actually imposed.”  That inquiry 
involves only an examination into the district court’s 
statements at sentencing, to determine whether it would have 
imposed the same sentence even absent the Guidelines error.  
Id. at 219.  We do not delve into the facts of a defendant’s 
conviction, to determine whether the improper sentence could 
somehow be justified.  Thus, it appears that if Lewis had 
framed his challenge as one asserting that the District Court 
improperly calculated his Guidelines range, the case would be 
remanded for resentencing.  The same should occur pursuant 
to his challenge of the far more serious constitutional 
violation: that the District Court sentenced him for an 
uncharged, unproven crime.1   
 
 In justifying its use of the trial record to uphold 
Lewis’s sentence, the majority relies heavily on our 2001 
opinion in Vazquez, where we determined that an Apprendi 
error was both a trial and a sentencing error.  271 F.3d 93 (3d 
                                              
1 Indeed, we are bound by statute to remand under such 
circumstances.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) (“If the court of 
appeals determines that . . . the sentence was imposed in 
violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect 
application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall 
remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such 
instructions as the court considers appropriate . . . .”). 
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Cir. 2001) (en banc).  Of note, Vazquez was a close case, with 
six of our thirteen judges agreeing with Judge Sloviter’s view 
in dissent that – as I again posit – Apprendi and therefore 
Alleyne involve errors that require us to decide whether what 
occurred at sentencing was harmless.  As Judge Sloviter 
noted, courts have routinely remanded for resentencing when 
an Apprendi error occurs.  Id. at 120 (Sloviter, J. dissenting).  
Distinguishing Johnson and Neder, relied upon by the 
majority in Vazquez, and again cited by the majority today, 
Judge Sloviter recognized that:  
 
In neither case was the sentence at 
issue; rather the issue was 
whether to uphold or reverse the 
jury’s verdict of guilty.  Here, we 
must decide whether an increase 
in prison time as a result of the 
error affects the defendant’s 
substantial rights.  As a result, 
those cases are inapposite here. 
 
Id. at 121.   
I joined Judge Sloviter's dissent and also wrote 
separately to emphasize that at no point did Apprendi indicate 
that such an unconstitutional sentence might be harmless 
simply because judges find it justified.  Id. at 130 (Rendell, J. 
dissenting).  The same can be said for Alleyne.  As Judge 
Sloviter concluded in Vazquez: “An error that will cause a 
defendant to spend four plus years more in prison than 
statutorily authorized by the jury’s verdict necessarily 
adversely affects the defendant’s substantial rights.”  Id. at 
120 (Sloviter, J dissenting).  This is an even clearer case for 
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remand than Vazquez, which was examined for plain error, as 
here we review Lewis’s appeal de novo, requiring only 
“harm” under Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 52(a).   
 
 Even leaving aside Judge Sloviter’s persuasive 
reasoning in Vazquez, that case is materially distinguishable 
in a way that should alter the result here.  In Vazquez the 
indictment properly alleged that the defendant had conspired 
to possess and distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine.  
271 F.3d at 101.  The Vazquez court therefore determined that 
the case involved a “trial error, which occurred when drug 
quantity was not submitted for a jury determination.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  Thus, it was at least arguable in that 
case that an error had occurred at trial because the jury was 
not asked to find the crime alleged in the indictment.   
 
But, in Alleyne as here, there was no trial error.  There 
was nothing wrong with the count of the indictment charging 
Lewis with a using or carrying violation.  There was similarly 
no omission at trial, in the jury charge or on the verdict sheet.  
And once the jury had been instructed, and had convicted 
Lewis of using or carrying a gun in relation to a violent crime, 
the District Court was required to sentence him pursuant to 
the applicable five year mandatory minimum.  This the Court 
failed to do.  Instead, it violated Lewis’s due process and 
Sixth Amendment rights when it sentenced him for an offense 
not found by the jury.  In sum, Lewis was charged, tried and 
convicted of one complete crime, but the District Court 
sentenced him for a different offense.  This was a pure and 
simple sentencing error.  
 
 Looking just to the length of Lewis’s prison term, if 
the error had not been committed he would have been 
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sentenced for his crime of conviction, such that his sentence 
would have been likely shortened by two years.  This alone 
constitutes clear prejudice and, therefore, reversible error.  
See United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 160 (4th Cir. 
2001) (finding prejudice where defendant was sentenced for 
term in excess of that charged or found by jury).   
 
 More fundamentally, it is inherently prejudicial for a 
defendant to be sentenced for a crime of which he was neither 
charged nor convicted.  The Eighth Circuit recognized this 
point in deciding one of the few other cases involving an 
Alleyne violation where a defendant was sentenced for a 
crime that was neither alleged in the indictment nor submitted 
to the petit jury.  United States v. Lara-Ruiz, 721 F.3d 554 
(8th Cir. 2013).  That court examined the case from the 
perspective of sentencing error, and held correctly that the 
defendant there was prejudiced “because he was sentenced 
for a statutory crime different from that which the jury found 
him guilty.”  Id. at 558. 
 
The Supreme Court has long upheld this elementary 
principle.  In Cole v. State of Arkansas, two defendants were 
charged and convicted of promoting an unlawful assemblage, 
but on appeal the state supreme court affirmed the conviction 
pursuant to a different offense involving the use of violence.  
333 U.S. 196 (1948).  In a unanimous opinion the Supreme 
Court reversed.  It found that the state supreme court had 
“affirmed [defendants’] conviction as though they had been 
tried and convicted of a violation of [section 1] when in truth 
they had been tried and convicted only of a violation of a 
single offense charged in [section 2], an offense which is 
distinctly and substantially different from the offense charged 
in [section 1].”  Id. at 202.  The Court added, “[i]t is as much 
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a violation of due process to send an accused to prison 
following conviction of a charge on which he was never tried 
as it would be to convict him upon a charge that was never 
made.”  Id. at 201.  In this case, Lewis was sent to prison on a 
brandishing charge which was never made and on which he 
was never tried. 
 
That this violates the basic guarantee of due process 
has been repeatedly reaffirmed both by the Supreme Court 
and the Third Circuit.  Dunn v. U.S., 442 U.S. 100, 106 
(1979) (“To uphold a conviction on a charge that was neither 
alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial 
offends the most basic notions of due process.”)2; Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979) (“It is axiomatic that a 
conviction upon a charge not made or upon a charge not tried 
constitutes a denial of due process.”); Lambert v. Blackwell, 
387 F.3d 210, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A] defendant’s due 
process rights are violated when his conviction is affirmed on 
                                              
2 The majority misconstrues Dunn.  The Court there noted 
that the defendant had been charged and convicted on the 
basis of false statements made in an interview in September, 
but the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction on the basis of 
testimony made in October.  445 U.S. at 106.  The Court held 
that “appellate courts are not free to revise the basis on which 
a defendant is convicted simply because the same result 
would likely obtain on retrial.”  Id. at 107.  Thus, the 
conviction had to stand or fall on the sufficiency of the charge 
presented to the jury, namely the September statements alone.  
The relevance of that case is obvious: “[f]ew constitutional 
principles are more firmly established than a defendant’s right 
to be heard on the specific charges of which he is accused.”  
Id. at 106.  
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an offense that he was not charged with and that was not 
presented to the jury or court that tried him.”).   
 
  Alleyne itself adhered to this understanding.  Writing 
for the Court, Justice Thomas found that:  
 
It is obvious, for example, that a 
defendant could not be convicted 
and sentenced for assault, if the 
jury only finds the facts for 
larceny, even if the punishments 
prescribed for each crime are 
identical. One reason is that each 
crime has different elements and a 
defendant can be convicted only if 
the jury has found each element of 
the crime of conviction. 
 
133 S. Ct. at 2162 (emphasis added).  The Court proceeded to 
hold that “similarly,” a brandishing offense constitutes a 
“separate, aggravated offense” from a using or carrying 
offense.  Id.  Thus, pursuant to Alleyne, sentencing a 
defendant for brandishing when he was only convicted of 
using or carrying, is not materially different from sentencing 
a defendant for assault if he was only convicted of larceny.   
 
In sum, Supreme Court precedent establishes that 
sentencing a defendant for an uncharged, untried crime 
constitutes reversible error.  It is equally clear that a 
defendant is prejudiced where an appellate court affirms a 
conviction or sentence upon anything other than the crime in 
the indictment and jury verdict.  To condone Lewis’s 
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sentence here as merely “harmless error” would violate both 
fundamental precepts of our criminal justice system.3   
 
Indeed, the majority’s exercise, in determining 
whether there was sufficient evidence of brandishing at trial 
to render the error harmless, guts the essence of Alleyne.  
There, the Court concluded that: 
 
The District Court imposed the 7–
year mandatory minimum 
sentence based on its finding by a 
preponderance of evidence that 
the firearm was “brandished.” 
Because the finding of 
brandishing increased the penalty 
to which the defendant was 
                                              
3 Comparing this violation to a constructive amendment 
further establishes the necessity of resentencing.  “An 
indictment is constructively amended when, in the absence of 
a formal amendment, the evidence and jury instructions at 
trial modify essential terms of the charged offense in such a 
way that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may 
have convicted the defendant for an offense differing from the 
offense the indictment returned by the grand jury actually 
charged.”  United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 532 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  “Constructive amendments are per se reversible 
under harmless error review . . . .” United States v. Daraio, 
445 F.3d 253, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).  I cannot reconcile our 
established precedent concerning constructive amendment 
with the majority’s decision.  Going forward, constructively 
amending the indictment during trial is per se reversible, but 
the same act during sentencing may be harmless.  
10 
 
subjected, it was an element, 
which had to be found by the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
judge, rather than the jury, found 
brandishing, thus violating 
petitioner's Sixth Amendment 
rights. 
 
Id. at 2163-64.  The look back to the trial record that the 
majority performs perpetuates the very error deemed to be 
reversible in Alleyne: judges substituting their view for the 
jury verdict, and thereby imposing a sentence which violates 
the Sixth Amendment.  In so doing, today’s decision 
impermissibly designates both the indictment and petit jury 
verdict a “mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the 
facts of the crime the State actually seeks to punish.”  Blakely 
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 307 (2004) (emphasis in 
original). 
 
 The lesson of Alleyne is that juries, not judges, must 
find the elements of a crime that support the sentence 
imposed.  The majority’s harmlessness exercise completely 
upends this principle, finding that judges can determine 
statutory elements from the facts in a trial, and uphold a 
sentence in direct conflict with the indictment and verdict.  
For that reason, even under a harmless error standard, I would 
vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. 
 
 
II.  Charging Error 
As noted above, the majority’s analysis proceeds from 
an entirely different premise: the sentence is fine as long as 
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the other “errors,” namely charging errors and trial errors, 
were all harmless.  I do not endorse this mode of analysis and 
Alleyne certainly did not rule on that basis, having discussed 
the deficient indictment (which also failed to allege 
brandishing) only as it related to the conclusion that 
brandishing constitutes an element of a distinct crime. At no 
point in that opinion did the Court characterize the issue as a 
charging or trial error.   
 
It is clear why that was the case.  To deem this a case 
of trial error, one must hold that error infected every aspect of 
Lewis’s proceedings except for the sentence itself.  That is, 
the majority assumes that the grand jury charge, the petit jury 
charge, the verdict sheet and the verdict itself were all in 
error, but then says those errors are subjected to a 
harmlessness inquiry, rather than a finding of structural error.  
This analysis turns the case on its head, in defiance of both 
logic and common sense. 
 
But even if we were to view the case upside down, as 
the majority insists we must, the errors at issue then become 
clearly structural.  Specifically, how can the failure to charge 
a crime, for which a defendant is later sentenced, not infect 
the entire proceedings so as to be structural error?  In 2006, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the exact question the 
majority addresses today: whether a materially defective 
indictment can constitute harmless error.  Yet in that case, 
United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007), the 
Court avoided the question, instead deciding that the 
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indictment at issue was adequate.  We are therefore left 
without any binding precedent on this issue.4  
 
The majority’s assessment of the relevant case law in 
this area is selective and incomplete.  First, the majority cites 
to our holding in Vazquez where we held that the Apprendi 
violation there, the failure to submit a drug quantity to a jury, 
constituted harmless error.  Yet the majority concedes that 
Lewis’s case is significantly different from Vazquez as here 
we have the “addition of error at the indictment stage.”  (Maj. 
Op. at 17.)  Given that we characterized Vazquez as a case 
involving both trial error and sentencing error, under the 
majority’s view this case involves indictment error, trial error 
and sentencing error all of constitutional magnitude.  Thus, 
even under the majority’s formulation, a constitutional error 
affected Lewis’s case from beginning to end. 
 
 I agree with the majority when it acknowledges that 
Vazquez does not control the analysis here, as it did not 
concern a materially defective indictment.  (Maj. Op. at 17.) 
Perhaps recognizing this yawning gap in case law, the 
majority relies most heavily on Washington v. Recuenco, 548 
U.S. 212 (2006), urging that it “provides the missing link . . . 
because it recognized that errors in an indictment can be 
harmless.”  (Maj. Op. at 18.)  This is incorrect.  The majority 
opinion in Recuenco never once mentions errors in an 
                                              
4 The circuit split that compelled the Court to take the case 
still remains.  Compare United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 
305-06 (4th Cir. 2003) (reviewing defective indictment for 
harmless error) with United States v. Inzunza, 638 F.3d 1006, 
1016-17 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A defective indictment is a 
structural flaw not subject to harmless error review.”) 
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indictment, the Fifth Amendment, or the defendant’s right to 
a grand jury, and it is obvious why.  That case concerned a 
state prosecution which involved an information, rather than 
an indictment.  Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 224 (Ginsburg, J. 
dissenting).   
 
Further, the Court there noted that the defendant had 
attempted to “characterize[e] this as a case of charging error, 
rather than of judicial factfinding.” Id. at 220 n.3.  But, the 
Supreme Court of Washington had looked only to whether the 
lack of a petit jury finding on a sentencing factor was 
structural error.  The Supreme Court therefore decided to 
“treat” the case “similarly.”  Id.  Accordingly, the sole 
holding of Recuenco was the uncontroversial proposition that, 
“[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure 
to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.” Id. at 
222.  In sum, the majority opinion in Recuenco does not deal 
at all with the issue of indictment error, and accordingly could 
not have “recognized” that “errors in an indictment can be 
harmless.”  Recuenco is not the “missing link” the majority is 
searching for. 
 
 Yet the majority agrees with the Government and 
reiterates its claim that the Sixth Amendment is “more worthy 
of protection under the ambit of structural error than the Fifth 
Amendment grand jury right.” (Maj. Op. at 20.)  This is a 
dubious proposition at best, and has never been propounded 
by any opinion of the Supreme Court or our court.5 Vazquez, 
                                              
5 The majority overlooks the fact that indictments safeguard 
not only the Fifth Amendment guarantee of charging by a 
grand jury, but also the Sixth Amendment right to “to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” U.S. 
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seemingly cited by the majority as authority for this idea, says 
nothing of the sort.6   
 
The question is not which Amendment is more worthy 
of protection.  The issue before us is simply whether a 
specific type of constitutional violation is significant enough 
                                                                                                     
Const. amend. VI; see, e.g., United States v. Radowitz, 507 
F.2d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding that an “indictment: 
(1) fulfills the Sixth Amendment ‘apprisal’ requirement by 
providing a defendant with notice of the charges against him 
in order that he may prepare a defense . . . .”). 
6  I disagree with the majority’s claim that, in Cotton, the 
Court “implied that it would not treat Fifth Amendment 
indictment error differently than Sixth Amendment trial 
error . . . .”  (Maj. Op. at 19.)  In fact, the issue before the 
Court was waiver of rights, and the Court briefly compared 
the two Amendments only to note the “longstanding rule ‘that 
a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as 
civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the 
right . . . .’” 535 U.S. at 634 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 
321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944)).  In other words, the Court 
clarified that both Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations may 
be waived, and thus reviewable only for plain error, due to a 
failure to timely object.  That is not at issue here, as both 
parties agree that Lewis timely asserted his Fifth Amendment 
rights.  Cotton does not speak to the question before us, nor 
does it “imply” any answer, as the Court explicitly did “not 
resolve” the question of whether defective indictments could 
constitute structural error.  Id. at 632.   
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to constitute structural error.7  It is this question, left 
unaddressed by the majority, to which I now turn. 
 
The Supreme Court has used varying language in 
categorizing constitutional errors.8  In one of the more recent 
                                              
7 I note separately that the majority’s claim of uniform 
agreement with other circuits is misplaced.  The Ninth Circuit 
has maintained that a deficient indictment is structural error.  
United States v. Inzunza, 638 F.3d 1006, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 
2011).  In addition, three of the cases cited by the majority 
either involved a proper indictment or simply did not address 
the issue of whether a defective indictment would constitute 
structural error, and thus provide no support for the majority’s 
position.  See United States v. Mack, 729 F.3d 594, 607 (6th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Kirklin, 727 F.3d 711, 716 (7th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. McKinley, 732 F.3d 1291, 1295 
(11th Cir. 2013).  The fourth case, United States v. Harakaly, 
734 F.3d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 2013), concerned a guilty plea and 
the issue of structural error was raised only on reply, such that 
the court devoted only a few sentences to the analysis.  It is 
also worth noting that the majority here cited some of these 
cases to note that they had reviewed an Alleyne claim for 
plain error, perhaps under the assumption that structural 
errors are automatically reversible even when not timely 
raised, and thus not amenable to plain error review.  This is 
incorrect.  Cotton itself noted that the question of structural or 
harmless error is resolved at step three of the plain error 
review process, but decided not to answer that question 
because step four resolved the case.  Thus, even structural 
errors are reviewed for plain error if not timely raised. 
8 I note that Stirone v. U.S., 361 U.S. 212, 219 (1960) found a 
deficient indictment to be “far too serious to be treated as 
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and concise summaries, Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 
129, 140 (2009) outlined three factors which it used to 
determine whether a plea breach was a structural error: 
whether it (1) necessarily rendered a trial unfair or unreliable 
for determining guilt or innocence, (2) defied analysis by 
harmless-error standards by affecting the entire adjudicatory 
framework, and/or (3) presented difficulty in assessing the 
effect of the error, more than for other errors subject to 
harmless error review.   
 
Factors two and three indicate that if an error can be 
plausibly reviewed for harmlessness, then it should be.  As 
such, we must first determine how harmless error review of a 
deficient indictment would proceed, before deciding whether 
such a review is workable.  The original formulation of 
harmless error in Chapman was “whether it appears beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.”  386 U.S. at 24 (internal 
quotation omitted).  In other words, the Chapman harmless 
error standard was developed for use in the trial context, and 
requires a judgment that the error did not affect the jury’s 
verdict. The majority appears to agree that this is the proper 
inquiry, such that any harmless error review must take into 
account the total effect of a defective indictment.  That is, 
harmless error review in this context would require a court to 
ask whether the indictment error contributed to the petit jury 
verdict. 
 
                                                                                                     
nothing more than a variance and then dismissed as harmless 
error.”  However, as this case preceded Chapman and the 
development of the harmless error doctrine, I cannot assume 
that it controls the question faced today.   
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With this in mind, we examine the three factors the 
Puckett Court cited to determine whether a deficient 
indictment constitutes structural error.  First, there can be no 
doubt that a deficient indictment affects the entire 
adjudicatory framework, and consequently defies analysis by 
harmless error standards.  In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Court 
listed certain structural errors that affect the entirety of trial, 
such as deprivation of counsel and a biased trial judge.  499 
U.S. at 309.  The Court noted that “[t]he entire conduct of the 
trial from beginning to end is obviously affected by the 
absence of counsel for a criminal defendant, just as it is by the 
presence on the bench of a judge who is not impartial. . . .  
Each of these constitutional deprivations is a similar 
structural defect affecting the framework within which the 
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process 
itself.”  Id. at 309-10.  
 
It is hard to think of a more “structural defect” than 
one affecting the indictment, which initiates and provides the 
foundation for a federal criminal trial.  See Kaley v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1097 (2014) (“This Court has often 
recognized the grand jury’s singular role in finding the 
probable cause necessary to initiate a prosecution for a 
serious crime.”)  Prosecutors are barred from informally 
amending or materially varying from the indictment; it puts 
the defendant on notice of the charges against him, protects 
him from double jeopardy, and serves as the direct 
interposition of the public in the charging process.   
 
Further, it is axiomatic that a trial proceeds according 
to the crimes as described in the indictment.  The defendant 
will attempt to rebut the crimes alleged and impeach 
testimony relating to the listed elements of those crimes.  He 
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would have no call to even consider whether to attack 
evidence with regard to any omitted element.  This is 
especially so where, as here, the indictment alleges one 
complete crime, which lacks an element of an uncharged, 
distinct offense.  From indictment to conviction, neither 
Lewis nor any similarly situated defendant would foresee the 
need to defend against such a separate offense, asserted only 
at the sentencing phase.  In short, it is clear that a deficient 
indictment affects the entire framework of the trial and defies 
analysis by harmless error standards. 
 
Next, we consider the related question of whether this 
error presents special difficulty in assessing prejudice.  It 
clearly does.  In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court 
found that denial of counsel of one’s choice constituted 
structural error.  548 U.S. 140 (2006).  In so concluding the 
Court held that: 
 
It is impossible to know what 
different choices the rejected 
counsel would have  made, and 
then to quantify the impact of 
those different choices on the 
outcome of the proceedings . . . .  
Harmless-error analysis in such a 
context would be a speculative 
inquiry into what might have 
occurred in an alternate universe. 
 
Id. at 150.  Similarly, here, assessing prejudice flowing from 
a faulty indictment would require sheer speculation into the 
possible decisions of the defendant and trial counsel if a 
different crime had been charged.  Just as in Gonzalez-Lopez, 
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to determine what would have happened if a proper 
indictment had been entered, we would need to enter “an 
alternate universe.”9   
 
The last factor, whether a defective indictment renders 
a trial unfair or unreliable, requires the least analysis.  In 
failing to put a defendant on notice of the elements of those 
charges against him, through a deficient indictment, the 
defendant is disadvantaged and has no reason to contest such 
omitted elements at trial.  Further, enabling the prosecution or 
Court to change the crime charged without formal process, 
either at trial or sentencing, undermines any notion of fairness 
in an adversarial context.  There can be no doubt that a 
material defect in the foundation of the trial necessarily 
renders it an unfair and unreliable vehicle for determining 
guilt or innocence.   
 
In short, a defective indictment satisfies all of the 
criteria used to determine structural error, such that it is not 
reviewable for mere harmlessness.  See United States v. 
Inzunza, 638 F.3d 1006, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A 
defective indictment is a structural flaw not subject to 
                                              
9 The majority overlooks this issue in conducting its own 
harmless error analysis.  It examines the testimony presented 
at trial and concludes that a brandishing charge was 
sufficiently proven.  In fact, a harmless error inquiry would 
require a showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
brandishing would still have been proven if the indictment 
had properly alleged that crime.  The inherently speculative 
nature of such an inquiry presents special difficulty in 
assessing prejudice, thus satisfying this structural error 
criterion.   
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harmless error review.”).  This conclusion stands firmly upon 
Alleyne, which held that where a brandishing charge is neither 
alleged in the indictment nor charged to the jury, such an 
error requires a remand “for resentencing consistent with the 
jury’s verdict.”  133 S. Ct. at 2164.  In that case, the Court did 
not pause to consider the issue of harmless error.  Its 
precedent, however, clearly dictates that where an indictment 
lacks the offense for which the defendant is later sentenced, 
structural error has occurred.  I dissent from the majority’s 
conclusion to the contrary. 
 
III.  Conclusion 
Over a decade ago in Vazquez, I noted that the logic in 
that decision would mean that the “government can charge 
and convict a defendant of manslaughter, but sentence him 
for murder, and, as long as the government produced 
evidence at trial that would support that sentence, we would 
not notice or correct the error under [plain error review] and 
require resentencing in accordance with the jury’s verdict.” 
271 F.3d at 130 (Rendell, J. dissenting).  Today the majority 
goes beyond even that dire prediction as it upholds a sentence 
for a crime different from that of conviction, under de novo 
review.  Under the majority’s reasoning, and contrary to 
Alleyne, a district court may now sentence a defendant 
pursuant to an improper mandatory minimum, in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment, and we would be obligated to uphold 
the sentence if we, an appellate court, find the evidence at 
trial to have been sufficient.  In short, today’s decision strikes 
at the very heart of the jury trial and grand jury protections 
afforded by the Constitution.   
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But perhaps I am wrong.  Perhaps we live in a brave 
new world where judges may determine what crimes a 
defendant has committed without regard to his indictment or 
jury verdict, and sentence him accordingly.  Or maybe 
Alleyne does not really mean what it says, when it proclaims 
brandishing and carrying offenses to be separate and distinct 
crimes, and that a defendant is entitled to be sentenced 
consistent with the jury’s findings.  But I take the Supreme 
Court at its word.   Until clearly instructed otherwise, I 
maintain that different crimes are just that, and district court 
judges cannot sentence a defendant to an uncharged crime 
simply because the evidence fits, nor can an appellate panel 
affirm such a sentence because they find that the evidence 
fits.  I adhere to the principle that both appellate and trial 
judges are required by the Constitution to respect, and 
sentence according to, a valid jury verdict, and on this basis I 
respectfully dissent. 
